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Closed Eyes,
Open Mind
An Exploration of
Consciousness
by Arlo Durham
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I

magine being trapped in a
glass cell, only able to move
within its cramped ten-foot
space. All of your basic needs are
provided for, though it is sometimes
difficult to tell how. You haven’t felt
hunger or thirst in a long time. It’s
very difficult to tell time. It could
be anywhere from three weeks to a
year since you first woke up in this
peculiar site. It’s not all bad, and you
haven’t been forgotten. Sometimes
you find correspondence from
friends and family. It seems written
with the understanding that this
correspondence will be one-sided,
but with hope that it may not
always be that way. On occasion,
they call upon action from you that
hardly seems possible from within
this cage. Outside of your cell,
the outside world is moving and
is, for lack of a better word, alive.
Yet, all you can do is watch from
this immobile tower. Imprisoned
for
reasons
beyond
your
understanding, watching without a
word to say...
Usually this kind of story would
be followed by the discovery of
some terrible, hidden scheme or
secret truth. And then, a harrowing
escape back into the greater world.
To become part of living society
once more, exposing what they
had found. Our story, however, is a
little bit different. One did escape
this jail, and found themself one
among many. Indeed, just one
among tens of thousands.1 Not
only that, the escapee found the
world to think these prisoners deaf
and blind. That the correspondence
was for the senders, not those
that would receive it. Society
thought them to be, for all intents
and purposes, gone. Not forever
perhaps, but gone nonetheless.
Strangely enough, this turned out
to be true for some of those whose
prisons are dark and silent. Empty,
even compared to the cell of our
escapee. And stranger still, this
misunderstanding was not the result
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of some malicious conspiracy, but a
conceptual misunderstanding. This
is the world of a vegetative patient.
Someone who experienced severe
enough trauma to enter such
a state, but still maintained an
awareness of their surroundings.
There are plenty of popular
and
sometimes
contradictory
assumptions about the vegetative
state,
called
Unresponsive
Wakefulness Syndrome (UWS)
by the medical community. For
example, it is a common cliche in
the media to find a character talking
to someone close who entered a
vegetative state as though they can
hear. And yet, it’s just as common
for the vegetative state to be
portrayed as a living body empty
of a mind; something closer to a
coma than anything else. Certainly
a vegetative patient doesn’t seem
to be as aware as the rest of us.
They are lying down on medical
beds, not walking around and
talking like we are. Namely, they
do not seem to respond at all. But,
medical research has discovered,
starting with Owen’s work in 2006,
that there may in fact be conscious
awareness in vegetative patients.2
And if that is true, there may very
well be something off about our
common sense understanding of
awareness.

Research in UWS
Researchers
in
the
aforementioned study, “Detecting
Awareness in the Vegetative
State,” looked to see whether a
patient diagnosed with UWS could
(1) understand the scientists as
they ask questions and (2) imagine
herself performing different tasks.
The scientists told the patient
to visualize playing tennis, or in
another case moving around her
home. While this was going on, the
researchers used fMRI imaging to
see what parts of the brain would
light up, indicating activity. The
results were exciting. It turned

out that the patient did respond
to the researchers’ requests and,
moreover, neural regions like the
supplementary motor area lit up.
This heavily implied that she was
visualizing some sort of activity
involving complex movement. The
UWS patient was imagining herself
playing tennis!
As you might imagine, the
promising results here quickly
inspired a whole series of other
studies intending to elaborate on
and explore this phenomenon.
Researchers found that such
awareness is only found in some
patients, and that some can even
take this a step further: They can
control their mental activity to
communicate with the researchers.3
The first part of the study was much
like Owen’s study described above,
but with a larger population of
patients. They only found five of
over fifty that could perform this
task. Even there, only two were
diagnosed with UWS (the other
three had separate disorders
of consciousness). The second
part of the study is where things
got interesting. The researchers
explained to the UWS patients that
they were to try communicating.
They established two mental tasks
easily distinguishable through fMRI
readings as “yes” and “no”. After
this explanation, the scientists asked
six questions. One of the patients
proved capable of following this
procedure, and answered five of the
six questions accurately. In short, a
patient who could not respond to
any attempts at bedside interaction
was able to both understand the
researchers and communicate with
them through modulating their
brain activity!

Disorders of
Consciousness
As a useful tool for this
discussion, let’s further define what
the vegetative state and similar so68
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called “disorders of consciousness”
actually are. We will use four
categories for ease of use:
1. Arousal: The ability to “wake
up” and exit sleep/sleep-like
states.
2. Responsiveness: The ability
to take action (reflexive or
otherwise) after receiving
stimuli.
3. Awareness: Of the common
sense sort, whether someone
has a clear capacity for thought
and mental tasks.
4. Consistency: Whether these
characteristics remain steady.
For example, someone in a
minimally conscious state may
exhibit limited responsiveness
one day and not on another.
Likewise, we will consider
four relevant disorders to assist
in clarifying this issue, as well as
clarifying what it means to be
“healthy” in this context4:
1. Healthy: When classifying
someone as “healthy” here,
we only mean that the
individual is not suffering
from a diagnosable disorder
of consciousness. They do
not suffer from significant
difficulties in the four criteria
listed above. Even if the
individual
struggles
with
illness or disorders of other

kinds, they are still considered
healthy in reference to what
we are discussing here.
2. Locked-In Syndrome: The
patient has lost control of their
body, with the exception of the
eyes. There is no significant
change to the mental life of
the patient, beyond what
is the psychological result
of being made a prisoner
within your own body. They
can still think and reason
much like a healthy patient.
It is unfortunately common
for Locked-In Syndrome to
be misdiagnosed as another
disorder of consciousness.
3. Minimally
Conscious:
Following
serious
injury,
someone in this state is
sometimes able to respond to
external stimuli. Depending
on the injury, the responses
can be quite limited, but they
are capable of responding
with actions like wiggling a
finger or blinking. The main
difficulty is that this is not
consistent from day to day,
beyond very general trends.
Minimally conscious patients
are sometimes misdiagnosed
with UWS if sufficient testing is
not done.
4. Coma: After a sufficiently
traumatic injury to place
one in a coma, the patient
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does not wake, respond to
stimuli, or give an indication
of awareness. If locked-in
syndrome is one end of the
spectrum, this is the opposite
end.
5. Vegetative State (UWS): One
suffering from this disorder
follows normal wake-sleep
cycles, but is not capable of
responding to stimuli. Recent
evidence suggests that, in at
least some cases, this does
not correspond with a loss
of awareness. As such, it is a
matter of dispute currently
whether UWS lies closer to
locked-in syndrome or a coma.

What is
Consciousness?
Now, with all of this noted, what
can we say about consciousness?
First of all, we have to wonder what
consciousness itself is. This is one
of those concepts that sounds so
simple when first mentioned. Of
course we know what consciousness
is. We all experience it, don’t we?
It’s the foundation of our experience
of the world and our surroundings.
But putting it into words is a much
more complicated affair. Actually
describing the phenomenon of
consciousness has been a complex
discussion
between
various
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philosophers and scientists for a
very long time. And to make it
better, we still don’t even have a
universally accepted definition of
consciousness yet. Every option
offered features some drawbacks.
Something that doesn’t work, or
doesn’t fit into the conception of
consciousness as it is experienced.
Just as an example to elaborate
this
point,
Merriam-Webster
defines it in several ways, including
“the quality or state of being aware
especially of something within
oneself.”6 This does provide a
useful description of a kind of what
we call consciousness, but it does
not suit other items associated
with it. It is the active awareness
of mental states, but this definition
does not reflect how a conscious
experience is a unified, holistic
experience of yourself and the
environment (or a representation of
it, if you prefer), even beyond what
you are “aware of,” or focusing on.
Another definition is “the state of
being characterized by sensation,

emotion, volition, and thought.”5
This one totally disregards any sort
of passive conscious awareness, as
well as sharing the same issue as
the first definition.
There are further examples
spread through the literature. Even
within a given field, consciousness
is a murky, poorly defined concept.
Perhaps it is better to instead focus
on the properties of consciousness.
What are the things that we think
of when we discuss consciousness?
This traditionally involves some
kind of awareness of one’s internal
states, and at least part of one’s
sensory experience. Consciousness
seems to also involve an integration
of various sensations into a cohesive
whole. Both of these together imply
that a receptivity to information is
important for consciousness. For
these sensations to be meaningful
and be integrated into larger
internal
constructs
(thought,
intention, etc.), some form of
memory is likely important. Further,
there is some sort of intangible

“selfhood” that seems to be
associated with consciousness, at
least in the popular conception of
it. A kind of feeling that capital-YYou are there and present. If this
is true, a level of self-awareness is
necessary for consciousness.
In the neuroscientific study
of consciousness, this issue of
definition is not a small matter. In
order to determine its particulars,
and what structures of the brain
might be relevant to it, we need
to have some set of properties
we can identify it by. Yet, even
with the varying definitions that
do exist, we still haven’t found
what is called the “neural correlate
of consciousness,” or the part
of the brain responsible for the
phenomenon of consciousness.
There just doesn’t seem to be a
place where processed information
comes together into what we
appear to experience as a seamless
whole. As interconnected as
the brain certainly is, there is no
obvious central location where
70
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some phenomenon like this would
emerge, and anything more specific
ends up bogged down in semantic
details.
Many important exploratory
studies in neuroscience involve
looking at cases in which the
relevant object of study is not
present and seeing if there is
something significant that differs
from the “average” subject. Yet,
with something as opaque as
consciousness, it is very difficult
to even visualize what something
lacking consciousness (or with
damaged/lesser
consciousness)
would have to look like. A lack of
consistent definition makes a study
of this sort incredibly difficult, if
not impossible. There have been
attempts, but none have received
universal acceptance. Considering
properties
of
consciousness
independently can be easier and
more productive, but there are
certain aspects of it that are not so
easily considered independently,
71

such as the integration of
information. We still have not
found a consistent, sufficiently
encompassing definition for what
we call consciousness. This is,
as hopefully I have illustrated, a
major roadblock to studying the
phenomenon.

Disorders of
Consciousness and
What They Can
Teach Us
When I mentioned above
that it is difficult to consider what
someone lacking consciousness
might look like, I did not note
that this confusion is a little more
recent. In the past, it seemed
clear enough that we had a good
example of patients who were
alive but lacked consciousness.
These were patients suffering from
disorders of consciousness. It’s in

the name! But then we came to
discover (with some horror, I must
imagine) Locked-In Syndrome.
Certain patients thought to lack
consciousness were apparently very
much aware and present. So then
Locked-In Syndrome was excluded
from this. But then in 2006, Owen’s
research opened up the real
possibility that UWS patients, those
who seemed to be the clearest
examples of subjects that could
“wake” but were not conscious,
were not quite as unaware as
they seemed. Patients diagnosed
with Locked-In Syndrome clearly
express awareness, and can
sometimes even communicate
by moving or blinking their eyes.4
But UWS patients? They do not
have any responsiveness. There
is no obvious indication that they
are “trapped” inside, like in the
case of Locked-In Syndrome. And
to complicate matters further, this
awareness only seems present in
some of the UWS patients! It isn’t
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clear why some seem to perform
better in these “consciousnessidentifying” tests.
So, what is it that these studies
have taught us about the nature
of consciousness? Among the
more important lessons, we know
that consciousness can survive
significant neurological trauma.
It’s not the sort of process that is
disrupted by a couple things going
wrong. Indeed, it isn’t disrupted
when a lot of things go very wrong.
This implies that consciousness is
the result of some process able to
accommodate for losing extremely
important systems that one would
think such a phenomenon would be
reliant upon. A separate, significant
item that researchers seem to have
learned from these studies is that
consciousness is, as mentioned
above, greatly benefited by if
not reliant on a receptivity to
information. Scientists conducted
this research by speaking to these
patients or providing stimulation
by other means (tactile or visual
stimuli). It may just be that we have
no means of communicating with
patients that are unable to receive
information through traditional

means, but it would make a
great deal of sense if this was a
prerequisite for consciousness
given other properties of the
phenomenon.
Some argue, however, that
these studies do not actually
show that UWS patients exhibit
consciousness. Klein, a philosopher
with an interest in these studies,
argued that the ability to follow
along with these imaging tasks
is not sufficient to suggest
consciousness.6
Consciousness
requires
intentionality,
and
intentionality was not shown in the
Owen paper or similar research. This
does not apply to all consciousness
studies of this kind, however. In the
case mentioned where one could
respond to questions by modulating
their brain activity, this could easily
be taken to be an expression
of intentionality more than just
following basic orders. This is a
complex task, not something that
could just be completed by going
through with simple commands.
Still, if this argument is acceptable, it
does limit the number of conscious
UWS patients even further, which
implies that perhaps certain

structures or connections need to
be maintained and fully operational
for consciousness to manifest.
There are a variety of arguments
by scientists and philosophers
debating the implications of what
this new research on consciousness
means, and how it changes the
fundamental assumptions that we
make about the phenomenon.

Conclusion
Consciousness is an incredibly
difficult concept to explore in
neuroscience, but recent research
into disorders of consciousness
is taking us closer to a real
understanding - and further from
the assumptions we thought were
self-evident. Within the last decade
and a half, a strong new interest
has emerged in studying this
phenomenon through minimally
conscious and UWS patients. New
definitions are being invented, and
new debates are erupting around
them. Only time will tell what
answers we will find, but once we
do, we will have finally discovered
for the first time what this core
element of our psyche truly looks
like.
■
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